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President Clinton this week kicks oﬀ what he says will be a
bipartisan eﬀort to reform Social Security as interest groups
line up with conﬂicting plans to save the national retirement
system....A bout three dozen groups announced last week
they had joined forces to lobby for privatization, calling
themselves the “Campaign to Save and Strengthen Social
Security.” Critics say such a plan is fraught with danger
because beneﬁts would depend on investment know-how and
market swings.
—Donna Smith, reporter for Reuters, Washington, D.C.,
6 December 1998
Suppose that we could introduce into the economic system
any institutions we wish for shifting risks instead of being
conﬁned to those developed historically....W ew ould want
to ﬁnd a market in which we can insure freely against any
economically relevant event. That is, an individual should be
able to bet, at ﬁxed odds, any amount he wishes on the
occurrence of any event which will aﬀect his welfare in any
w a y .T h eo d d s ,o r ,i nad i ﬀerent and more respectable
language, the premium on the insurance, should be
determined, as any other price, so that supply and demand
are equal. Under such a system, productive activity and risk-
bearing can be divorced, each being carried out by the one or
ones best qualiﬁed.
—Kenneth Arrow, “Risk, Insurance, and Resource
Allocation,” in Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing (1971)
A major concern in the debate about replacing the current U.S. social
security system with a system of self-directed personal investment ac-
Zvi Bodie is professor of ﬁnance and economics at the Boston University School of Man-
agement.
291counts (PIAs) is that ordinary Americans will not be able to cope with
the complexities of providing for an adequate income in retirement by
investing on their own.1 The proponents of PIAs point to the beneﬁts of
knowing the value of the funds in your own retirement account and having
the freedom to make investment choices from an array of options. This
investment choice would allow people to select a risk proﬁle consistent
with their own preferences and circumstances. But skeptics point out that
the greater individual choice in PIAs also poses greater potential risks.
Economists cringe at the suggestion that increasing the choices available
to people can make them worse oﬀ. If the new set of choices includes the
status quo as one alternative, goes the reasoning, then surely one’s welfare
cannot decrease. This paper attempts to show how to make the econo-
mist’s reasoning work in the context of PIAs. It seeks to show how govern-
ment and private-sector ﬁnancial institutions can oﬀer people a menu of
investment choices that are at least as good as the ones they have now.
The goal is to allow ordinary people to make informed investment deci-
sions about risk-reward trade-oﬀs and to implement those decisions at the
lowest possible cost to themselves and society. Costs are deﬁned to include
not only explicit advisory fees or commissions but also the expenditure of
one’s own leisure time and the time and patience of friends and relatives
in deciding how to invest. Social costs include possible market distortions
arising from deceptive advertising or from unintended subsidies that may
encourage suboptimal risk-taking behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I examine the economic theory
of optimal lifetime consumption and portfolio selection to see what guid-
a n c ei to ﬀers for the investment of retirement savings. Then I show how
to use ﬁnancial engineering to produce a menu of investment choices de-
ﬁned by a guaranteed minimum level of beneﬁts plus participation in a
reference portfolio of stocks. I then consider the role of the government in
implementing a system of private investment accounts. Finally, I critically
examine some of the investment advice oﬀered by investment-manage-
ment ﬁrms.
8.1 Life-Cycle Investing and Financial Engineering
The economics literature on household portfolio selection over the life
cycle is vast. While many of the scientiﬁc issues regarding how people
actually make life-cycle investment decisions remain in dispute, much
progress has been made in the past forty years in developing normative
models of how such decisions can be made optimally. Those normative
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1. In a recent study of the investment behavior of participants in TIAA-CREF, Bodie and
Crane (1997) ﬁnd some cause for “cautious optimism” about the ability of people to make
informed choices about asset allocation.models are today being implemented by a relatively new branch of applied
economics called ﬁnancial engineering.
Financial engineering is the practical application of economic theory to
the intertemporal allocation of resources and the management of risk. Its
principal analytic tools are continuous-time stochastic optimization mod-
els and arbitrage-based models of contingent-claims pricing. In this sec-
tion of the paper, I brieﬂy summarize the development of ﬁnancial engi-
neering and its application to the investment-management business.
8.1.1 Portfolio Optimization
The application of economic theory to investment management began
in 1952 with the Markowitz (1952) mean-variance theory. This theory pro-
vided a tractable model for quantifying the risk-return trade-oﬀ to be de-
rived from a set of risky assets by identifying the standard deviation of a
portfolio’s rate of return as its risk and the mean as its reward. The inputs
to the Markowitz portfolio-selection process consist of a set of risky assets
characterized in terms of their means, standard deviations, and correla-
tions with each other. The outputs are in the form of a menu of risk-return
choices arrayed along an “eﬃcient portfolio frontier.”
Tobin (1958) added a risk-free asset to the list of inputs and showed how
this expanded the eﬃcient frontier and simpliﬁed the process of ﬁnding
the optimal mix. Building on the work of Markowitz and Tobin, Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965) investigated the equilibrium structure of asset
prices, and their capital asset pricing model (CAPM) became the basis for
measuring the risk-adjusted performance of professional portfolio manag-
ers.2 Today, the mean-variance model is at the core of quantitative models
for asset allocation and can even be implemented on a personal computer.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, models of optimal portfolio selection
being developed in the academic world became considerably more sophis-
ticated. Merton (1969, 1971, 1975) introduced continuous-time stochastic
models into portfolio theory, thereby extending and enriching the static,
single-period mean-variance model. He showed that hedging c a nb ea s
important as diversifying in the demand for assets. The desire to hedge
against a risk gives rise to a demand for securities that are highly corre-
lated with that risk. For example, a desire to hedge against adverse changes
in short-term interest rates induces a demand for long-term bonds. Mer-
ton (1973b) also developed the multifactor intertemporal capital asset
pricing model (ICAPM) and proved that, in equilibrium, a security’s risk
premium will reﬂect not only its beta on the market portfolio but also its
betas on commonly shared hedging portfolios.3
2. For a more detailed account of these developments, see Bernstein (1992). Markowitz,
Sharpe, and Tobin all were awarded Nobel Prizes in economics.
3. For references on dynamic portfolio theory and intertemporal capital asset pricing, see
Merton (1992).
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was and is ideally suited to the structure of the mutual fund industry.
Mutual funds provide the real-world counterparts to the optimally pro-
portioned portfolios of the theory. Thus, Merton’s ICAPM provides a the-
oretical rationale for investment ﬁrms to oﬀer a “family” of optimal hedg-
ing portfolios suited to the needs of diﬀerent clienteles. The ﬁrm can put
various combinations of its member funds together in proportions that
reﬂect the right mix for customers in various stages of the life cycle. These
so-called life-cycle funds are then oﬀered as ﬁnal products.
8.1.2 Options as Fundamental Building Blocks
The practical role of options and other derivatives is perhaps best un-
derstood in the context of the state-preference theory of Arrow (1964) and
Debreu (1959). The fundamental building blocks of this theory—known
as Arrow-Debreu securities—are claims that pay $1.00 contingent on a
certain state of the world at a certain date and zero otherwise. The theory
developed by Arrow and Debreu provided a general and useful framework
for studying many issues in welfare economics and ﬁnance; however, until
the early 1970s, it was believed that, because pure Arrow-Debreu securities
have no real-world counterparts, people would not be able to observe their
prices and use them for the allocation of resources and the management
of risks.
That view started to change in 1973 with the dramatic discoveries in
option-pricing theory by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973a)
and the opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange.4 The basic in-
sight underlying these models is that a dynamic portfolio trading strategy
in the stock can be found that will replicate the returns from an option on
that stock. Hence, to avoid arbitrage opportunities, the option price must
always equal the value of this replicating portfolio. The resulting pricing
formula has only one input that is not directly observable: the volatility of
the return on the stock.
Discovery of the option-pricing model and the technique of dynamic
replication was soon followed by its extension to the theory and practice
of investment management. Brennan and Schwartz (1976) applied it to
the pricing of equity-linked life insurance, and Merton, Scholes, and
Gladstein (1978) explored the performance of a portfolio in which 90 per-
cent of the funds were invested in six-month commercial paper and the
remainder used to purchase a portfolio of six-month call options on se-
lected individual stocks. This idea was actually put to work with the for-
mation of a new mutual fund, Money Market/Options. Leland (1980)
wrote about and implemented a service that he called portfolio insurance.5
4. For the story of how these models were developed, see Scholes (1998) and Merton
(1998).
5. Bernstein (1992) has a chapter devoted to these authors’ ill-fated venture in portfolio in-
surance.
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(1978) showed that the prices of options could be used to derive the prices
of the pure state-time claims envisioned by Arrow and Debreu.6
During the 1970s, exchanges were created to trade standardized futures
and options contracts on major currencies, on U.S. Treasury bills and
bonds, and on stocks. The success of these markets measured in terms of
trading volume can be attributed in good part to the increased demand
for managing risks in the volatile economic environment of the 1970s. This
success in turn strongly aﬀected the speed of adoption of quantitative ﬁ-
nancial models.
During the 1980s, the user base of ﬁnancial engineering expanded
greatly, becoming global in scope and including commercial and invest-
ment banks and institutional investors of all types, especially pension
funds. Practitioners in ﬁnancial institutions actually took on a major role
in applied research, including the creation of proprietary databases, the
development of new numerical methods for solving partial diﬀerential
equations, and the implementation of sophisticated estimation techniques
for measuring model parameters. By the late 1980s, the computational
models used by practitioners in some investment ﬁrms became as sophisti-
cated as any found in the academic journals. Indeed, the people devel-
oping these applied models were in many cases recruited from university
ﬁnance departments.
8.1.3 A Continuous-Time Model of Life-Cycle Financial Decisions
In contemporary ﬁnancial economics, the standard theoretical frame-
work for analyzing life-cycle decisions is Merton’s (1969, 1971, 1973a)
continuous-time model of optimal consumption and portfolio choice.
Merton’s model is more general than the older Markowitz model of port-
folio choice. The Markowitz model assumes that individuals make deci-
sions “myopically” ina static single-period framework.Merton’s model as-
sumes that individuals make choices that maximize their expected utility
from the consumption of goods and leisure over their lifetimes and that
they are free to change their choices at any time.
There are several distinct time horizons in Merton’s model. The planning
horizon is the total length of time for which one plans. The time horizon
for the retirement goal would be the balance of one’s lifetime. Thus, for a
twenty-ﬁve-year-old who expects to live to age eighty-ﬁve, the retirement
planning horizon would be sixty years. As one ages, the planning horizon
typically gets shorter and shorter.
The decision horizon is the length of time between decisions to revise the
portfolio. The length of the decision horizon is controlled by the individ-
ual within certain limits. Some people review their portfolios at regular
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6. Hakansson (1976) even proposed that ﬁnancial intermediaries issue a type of Arrow-
Debreu security that he dubbed supershares.intervals—once a month (when they pay their bills) or once a year (when
they ﬁle income-tax forms). People of modest means with most of their
wealth invested in bank accounts might review their portfolios very infre-
quently and at irregular intervals determined by some “triggering” event
such as getting married or divorced, having a child, or receiving a bequest.
A sudden rise or fall in the price of an asset a person owns might also
trigger a review of the portfolio. People with substantial investments in
stocks and bonds might review their portfolios every day or even more fre-
quently.
The shortest possible decision horizon is the trading horizon, deﬁned as
the minimum time interval over which investors can revise their portfolios.
The length of the trading horizon is not under the control of the individ-
ual. Whether the trading horizon is a week, a day, an hour, or a minute is
determined by the structure of the markets in the economy (e.g., when the
securities exchanges are open or whether organized oﬀ-exchange markets
exist).
To add more realism to Merton’s model, Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson
(1992) add a third choice variable—the amount of work people choose to
do. In their model, individuals start out with an initial endowment of ﬁ-
nancial wealth and earning power from labor (their human capital). The
market values of both components of wealth—ﬁnancial and human capi-
tal—change continuously and stochastically. The wage rate (the return on
human capital) is perfectly positively correlated with the market return on
traded assets.7 Consumption, wealth, and rates of return are all denomi-
nated in real terms, that is, in units of the consumption good. At each
point of time in the model, individuals determine the amount of their
consumption, the proportion of their ﬁnancial wealth to invest in risky
assets (vs. the safe asset), and the fraction of their maximum possible labor
income that they will “spend” on leisure so as to maximize their dis-
counted lifetime expected utility.
The model’s results indicate that the fraction of an individual’s ﬁnancial
wealth optimally invested in equity should “normally” decline with age
for two reasons. The ﬁrst stems from the fact that human capital is usually
less risky than equity and that the value of human capital usually declines
as a proportion of an individual’s total wealth as one ages. For example,
in an individual’s early years of work, her wealth is often dominated by
relatively safe human capital so that a large share of her ﬁnancial wealth
should be in risky assets in order to get suﬃcient risk in her total wealth.8
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7. While the assumption of perfect correlation is not entirely realistic, it greatly simpliﬁes
the development of the formal model.
8. Other theoretical models support the practical notion that the fraction in equity should
normally decline with age. For a review of theoretical models that yield results similar to
popular guidelines regarding the age-equity relation, see Samuelson (1994) and Jagganathan
and Kocherlakota (1996).Second, at any given age, the greater the ﬂexibility an individual has to
alter her labor supply, the greater the amount she will invest in risky assets.
Individuals may be able to oﬀset changes in the value of their ﬁnancial
wealth by changing the amount they work. They may have the opportu-
nity to work longer hours, take on extra jobs, or delay retirement. If
younger workers have more opportunity to alter their labor supply than
older workers, the share of assets held as risky equity should decline with
age.9
8.2 Personal Investment Accounts with a Guaranteed Floor
The theory presented in the previous section is silent on the question of
what institutions people will use or should use to achieve their optimal
lifetime consumption plans. As we know, the mix of government-provided
social security, employment-related pension plans, and other private sav-
ing in the provision of retirement income varies widely from country to
country and even within each country. And it is precisely the question of
the optimal institutional mix that is at the center of controversy in the
ongoing debate about social security reform in the United States today.
But at least on one point there seems to be a consensus—participation
in the reformed social security system should be mandatory, and there
should be some minimum guaranteed level of real retirement beneﬁts for
everyone who pays into the system. There also seems to be a consensus
that, at least for beneﬁts in excess of the guaranteed level, people ought to
have some portfolio choice. In the terminology of pension professionals,
one can describe such a system as a ﬂoor plan—a deﬁned-contribution
plan with a deﬁned-beneﬁt minimum or ﬂoor level. Recently, Brennan and
Cao (1996) have shown that, for uninformed investors, such payoﬀ func-
tions may be Pareto eﬃcient. In this section of the paper, I show how to
use stock-index options and option prices to produce personal investment
accounts with this feature.10 As is customary, I divide the planning period
into two parts: the accumulation phase before retirement and the postre-
tirement phase where the accumulation is paid out as a lifetime annuity.
8.2.1 The Preretirement Phase
Options expand the menu of risk-return choices open to investors. In-
dex options make it possible to combine downside protection with some
upside tied to the performance of an underlying index portfolio. Investor
interest in this kind of product has grown recently. In 1995, life insurance
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9. It should also be noted that the safe asset in the Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992)
model is a bond whose interest and principal is denominated in units of the consumption
good. Its real-world counterpart would therefore have to be a bond similar to the inﬂation-
protected bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury in 1997.
10. For an earlier version of this idea, see Bodie and Crane (1999).companies in the United States began to oﬀer ﬁve- to seven-year variable
annuities that combined a ﬂoor with some upside. By 1997, some thirty
insurance companies had introduced these products in the United States
(e.g., KeyIndex annuities issued by Keyport, a division of Liberty Fi-
nancial).
Table 8.1 shows prices of call options on a reference portfolio, expressed
per $100 share of the portfolio.11 The prices increase as the number of
years to expiration increases and fall as the exercise price rises. For ex-
ample, the entry $24.59 in the next-to-last column of the ﬁrst row is the
price of a one-year call option on a $100 share of a reference portfolio
with an exercise price of 80. The price is $29.12 for an otherwise identical
option with a maturity of two years (one row down), and it is $10.45 if
the option’s exercise price is 100 (one column to the right).
Consider the risk-reward opportunities available to people who divide
their wealth between call options and risk-free bonds maturing on the
same date that the options expire. These investors are guaranteed a certain
minimum rate of return by virtue of the fact that a fraction of their wealth
is invested in the risk-free asset, and they cannot lose more than they invest
in the options. The reward is the potential additional return that can come
if the calls end up “in the money.”
The investor’s exposure to risk depends on three variables: the exercise
price of the calls (X); the fraction of wealth invested in calls (w); and the
maturity of the calls (T). A trade-oﬀ between reward and risk exists along
each of these three dimensions of choice. Equation (1) expresses the basic
formula that relates the investor’s terminal wealth to the value of the refer-
Table 8.1 Stock-Index Call-Option Prices
Exercise Price ($)
Years to
Maturity 20 40 60 80 100
1 80.98 61.95 42.94 24.59 10.45
2 81.90 63.81 45.82 29.12 16.13
3 82.79 65.58 48.62 33.19 20.92
4 83.63 67.27 51.29 36.88 25.21
9 87.25 74.61 62.57 51.72 42.36
16 91.02 82.21 73.87 66.22 59.31
25 94.28 88.70 83.40 78.44 73.84
Note: These prices were computed using the Black-Scholes formula with S  $100, r  .05,
and volatility  .2.
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11. Long-term options such as these are called LEAPS, an acronym for long-term equity
anticipation securities. Options on the S&P 500 are traded on the Chicago Board Options
Exchange under the symbol SPX. They are European-type options, which means that they
can be exercised only at their expiration date.ence portfolio on the option’s expiration date and to the three choice vari-



















where WT is the investor’s wealth at time T, r is the risk-free interest rate,
C(X, T) is the price of a call with exercise price X expiring at time T, and
ST is the value of the reference portfolio at time T. For ease of interpreta-














where R is the portfolio’s rate of return.
Let us examine each of the risk-reward trade-oﬀs one at a time.
Payoﬀ Diagrams
First, consider the trade-oﬀ arising from the choice of exercise price.
The exercise price determines the threshold value of the market index, that
is, the value of the index that must be reached in order for the call option
to wind up “in the money” at expiration. The higher this threshold value,
the greater the client’s exposure to risk. However, since the price of the
call falls when X rises, the client’s upside participation rate rises along
with the increase in risk exposure. Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ between risk
and reward.
To derive the formula for the payoﬀ function relating R and X, substi-



























Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate the eﬀect of changing X. Figure 8.1 shows
the client’s rate of return as a function of the value of the reference portfo-
lio for diﬀerent exercise prices. The curves all have the kinked shape char-
acteristic of call-option payoﬀ diagrams. In every case, the investment
manager invests 90 percent of the client’s wealth in the risk-free asset and
10 percent in stock-index calls.12 The minimum rate of return on the port-
folio is therefore the same in all cases: 5.5 percent.
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12. Note that a call option with an exercise price of zero is equivalent to the stock itself if
the stock pays no dividend over the life of the option.The higher the exercise price, the steeper the slope to the right of the
kink. This slope is the upside participation rate. For example, if X is set at
80, the option price is $24.59, and the upside participation rate is .004. If
X is set at the current level of the reference index (X  100), then the
upside participation rate is approximately .010. This trade-oﬀ between
threshold value (X) and upside participation is shown in ﬁgure 8.2.
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Fig. 8.1 Payoﬀ diagrams with diﬀerent exercise prices
Note: The portfolio has 90 percent invested in the risk-free asset earning 5 percent and the
other 10 percent invested in calls with exercise price X. T  one year, and .2.
Fig. 8.2 Trade-oﬀ between exercise price and participation rateRisk and Reward in an Options Framework
Now consider what happens if we vary the minimum return (Rmin)b y
changing the fraction of wealth at risk (w), holding constant the other two
choice variables—X and T. Figure 8.3 shows the portfolio rate of return
as a function of the percentage change in the underlying stock index when
r  5 percent, T  one year, X  100e.05, and C  8.
Each curve corresponds to a diﬀe r e n tl e v e lo fw. The vertical intercept
is the minimum rate of return on the portfolio, and the slope of each
payoﬀ curve to the right of the kink is the corresponding upside participa-
tion rate. The higher the value of w, the lower the minimum return, and the
higher the upside participation rate. For all three curves, the kink occurs at
the risk-free rate of 5 percent per year because, if the percentage increase
in the market index turns out to be less than this, the calls expire worthless.
Note that all three payoﬀ curves meet in a common break-even point,
where the percentage increase of the market index is 13.4 percent and the
portfolio return equals the risk-free interest rate.13
The risk-reward trade-oﬀ frontier shown in ﬁgure 8.4 corresponds to
T  one year and X  100e.05. The Black-Scholes price of the correspond-
ing call is 8. In ﬁgure 8.4, the Rmin is measured on the horizontal axis, and
the upside participation rate is measured on the vertical axis. The slope of
this trade-oﬀ line is the reward-to-risk ratio.
Eﬀect of the Time Horizon on the Risk-Reward Trade-Oﬀ
As discussed in section 8.1.3 above, one can distinguish at least two
diﬀerent meanings of the term time horizon: the planning horizon and the
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Fig. 8.3 Payoﬀ diagrams with diﬀerent amounts of wealth at risk
Note: r  5 percent, T  one year, X  100e.05, and C  8. All the payoﬀ functions meet in
a common intersection point, whose coordinates are 13.4 and 5 percent.
13. More generally, this intersection point occurs where ST/S0  er(1  C/100).decision horizon. The planning horizon is the total length of time for which
one plans. The decision horizon is the length of time between decisions to
revise the portfolio. The shortest possible decision horizon is the minimum
trading interval over which investors can revise their portfolios. In this
paper, as in other single-period models of portfolio selection, T refers to
the length of the decision horizon, not the length of the planning horizon.
The eﬀect of the length of the time horizon T for an investor who is
willing to put 8 percent of his wealth at risk is shown in ﬁgure 8.5. Note
that, the longer the length of the decision horizon, the worse the trade-oﬀ
between risk and reward. For instance, the upside participation rate for a
one-year period is 100 percent, for four years 50 percent, and for twenty-
ﬁve years only 20 percent. This occurs because the call price C is an in-
creasing function of T and asymptotically approaches 100 in the limit as
T gets larger and larger.
8.2.2 The Postretirement Phase
To this point, I have been discussing the accumulation phase of an in-
vestor’s life cycle. Now I turn my attention to the postretirement phase of
the life cycle, when the appropriate contract is a life annuity. I begin by
explaining the way a variable annuity works. An assumed investment rate
of return (AIR) is used to convert the total accumulation available at re-
tirement into an annuity with a “notional” beneﬁt payment, B0. The annu-
ity exceeds (falls short of) this notional value if the cumulative realized
rate of return on the underlying reference portfolio exceeds (falls short of)
the AIR. Each year, the amount received equals the previous year’s beneﬁt













Fig. 8.4 The risk-reward trade-oﬀ frontierwhere Rt is the actual real rate of return on the underlying portfolio in
year t.
Thus, after t years of retirement, the annual beneﬁt will reﬂect cumula-
tive investment returns relative to the assumed return in each of the previ-


















With no loss of generality, we can divide both sides of this equation by






























For simplicity, I use the risk-free real interest rate as the AIR. Assume
that enough has been accumulated to qualify for a risk-free annuity of
$10,000 per year. Consider three alternative annuity designs: A risk-free
real annuity of $10,000 per year for twenty years; a variable annuity with
a “notional” beneﬁt payment (B0) of $10,000; and a variable annuity with
a ﬂoor and a cap. Figure 8.6 displays the payoﬀ functions for the three
alternative annuities as a function of the cumulative return factor. I as-
sume a guaranteed ﬂoor equal to $7,000, a risk-free real interest rate of
3.5 percent per year, and an annualized standard deviation of return on
the underlying portfolio equal to 15 percent. The question is, What is the
value of the cap for the third annuity design?
To address this question, I employ ﬁnancial engineering. The ﬁrst step
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Fig. 8.5 Eﬀect of time horizon on risk-reward trade-oﬀ
Note: w  .08, r  5 percent, and X  100e.05.is to recognize that setting a ﬂoor and a cap on the variable beneﬁt pay-
ment is equivalent to buying a “collar,” that is, buying a European put
option with an exercise price of $7,000 and ﬁnancing it by writing a call
with a higher exercise price.14 Since the annuity consists of a sequence of
twenty beneﬁt payments, twenty collars are required, each with a maturity
that is one year longer than the previous one. I compute the total price of
the twenty puts using the Black-Scholes formula. Since each of the twenty
annual payments is capped at the same level, the problem is to ﬁnd the
“exercise price” of the calls that will make their total price equal to the
price of the puts.
Figure 8.7 shows the trade-oﬀ between the ﬂoor and the cap expressed
as a percentage of the notional beneﬁt. Thus, with the ﬂoor set at 70 per-
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Fig. 8.6 Annuity payoﬀ diagram
14. For a more complete explanation of collars, see Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1999,
631–32).
Fig. 8.7 Trade-oﬀ between the variable annuity ﬂoor and the capcent, the cap must be 161 percent. The higher the ﬂoor, the lower the cap.
Of course, if the ﬂoor is set at 100 percent of the notional beneﬁt, then the
cap must also be set at 100 percent.
8.3 The Role of Private-Sector Financial Institutions
How can private-sector ﬁnancial institutions provide credible guaran-
tees of minimum real rates of return over long periods of time? The sim-
plest organizational structure to perform this function would be that of a
mutual fund or an investment trust that buys TIPS (Treasury inﬂation-
protected securities) and index options and distributes a pro rata share to
all its shareholders. The index options could be either exchange traded—
if the required maturities are actually traded—or synthesized through dy-
namic replication. With such an organizational form, there can be no risk
of default.
Alternatively, the institution could be organized as an insurance com-
pany that sells guaranteed investment contracts to its customers and has
suﬃcient investor capital to make its liabilities free of default risk. To
minimize the capital required for this purpose, the ﬁrm could hedge its
liabilities dynamically using index futures contracts. The resulting dy-
namic hedges would be “model dependent” and therefore less than per-
fect.15
8.4 The Role of Government
In addition to operating what remains of the current social security
system and mandating minimum contributions to personal retirement ac-
counts, there are at least two other important roles that have been pro-
posed for the government: to issue inﬂation-protected bonds for people to
invest in and to guarantee a minimum level of retirement beneﬁts from
PIAs.
8.4.1 Inﬂation-Protected Securities
The ﬁrst of these is critical.16 The U.S. Treasury started issuing such
bonds—TIPS—in January 1997, and policy spokesmen have made it clear
that a primary purpose of these securities is to serve as a safe way for
people to save for retirement. Their coupons and principal are linked to
the CPI. Currently, the longest maturity is thirty years. Qualiﬁed ﬁnancial
institutions are allowed to “strip” them to oﬀer customers zero-coupon
bonds of any maturity up to thirty years.
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16. On this point, economists with policy views as diverse as Milton Friedman and James
Tobin are in agreement.In September 1998, the Treasury started selling a new type of inﬂation-
protected savings bond, Series I, which is targeted at lower- and middle-
income people. I bonds oﬀer a ﬁxed real rate of interest, which can be
extended at the investor’s option for up to thirty years. They are tax de-
ferred until cashed in, come in denominations as small as $50, and can
be purchased with no commissions. Individuals are limited to buying a
maximum of $30,000 worth of them per year.
Merton (1983) has proposed that a superior alternative to indexing re-
tirement annuities to the cost of living is to index them to aggregate per
capita consumption. The idea motivating this proposal is that it is
standard-of-living protection rather than cost-of-living protection that is of
prime concern to most individuals. With a cost-of-living-linked annuity,
the beneﬁt is ﬁxed in real terms regardless of what happens to the standard
of living in the economy. Individuals receiving a cost-of-living annuity
over a long period of retirement may experience a substantial decline in
their relative standard of living compared to the rest of the population.
According to the proposal, however, pensioners would receive a beneﬁt
that changes with per capita consumption, thus maintaining their relative
standard of living.
Note that, with indexation to aggregate per capita consumption, there
is no need to distinguish between the inﬂation and the real per capita
consumption components of the change. The beneﬁts are simultaneously
protected against both. By linking the beneﬁts to per capita consumption
rather than the consumer price index, the pension scheme is made more
consistent with both ﬁnance theory and common sense. One way to
describe the per capita consumption annuity proposal is as a deﬁned-
contribution plan oﬀering variable-annuity contracts based on an under-
lying portfolio of bonds that are indexed to aggregate per capita con-
sumption. Merton envisions a major role for the government as a ﬁnancial
innovator in making this type of product possible by issuing consumption-
indexed bonds that are free of default risk.
8.4.2 Government Guarantees
Given the existence of default-free TIPs of all maturities, it is hard to
see the need for government guarantees of retirement income. Individuals
desiring a risk-free retirement income can purchase these bonds or invest
in retirement annuities that are collateralized by these bonds. Other meth-
ods of guaranteeing retirement income have signiﬁcant costs (see Bodie
and Merton 1992). For example, in the United States, the federal govern-
ment provides guarantees of corporate deﬁned-beneﬁt pensions through
the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation.17 Let us consider some general
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Bodie and Merton (1993) or Bodie (1996).issues that inevitably arise when government serves as the guarantor of
such household assets.
In the past, some among both the general public and politicians have
mistakenly believed that a loan guarantee costs the government nothing
unless there eventually turns out to be a shortfall.18 However, perhaps
owing to the large losses in the deposit insurance funds, such arguments
seem to appear less frequently now. Indeed, since 1990, the U.S. govern-
ment has taken steps in its budget process to account for the cost of the
guarantees it issues (see OMB 1993).
Even if it recognizes the cost of its guarantees, the government is not
obliged to price them accordingly. There can be political pressure for the
government to charge less than the fair market premium for its guarantees
or not to charge for them at all. Government guarantees are a politically
attractive form of expenditure because they are less “visible” than outright
cash outlays or budget allocations. To keep premiums low, the government
must require the insured entity to hedge its insured liabilities completely.
If the imposition of strict asset restrictions by the government guarantor
is also ruled out, then the guarantor is left with no feasible way to perform
its guarantee function eﬃciently.
8.5 Conventional Investment Advice and Economic Theory
There are many sources of advice for investors, including newspaper
columns, magazine articles, and web sites on personal investing. In addi-
tion, educational materials are provided by mutual fund groups and other
providers of ﬁnancial products. While there are some diﬀerences in advice
provided by these various sources, a nonexhaustive search indicates that
they generally agree on a set of practical guidelines, which can be summa-
rized as follows:
● Investors should have an emergency fund invested in short-term safe
assets. This fund should be held outside one’s retirement account to avoid
the tax and other penalties generally associated with having to withdraw
funds prematurely from a retirement account.
● Tax-advantaged assets, such as municipal bonds, should be held out-
side one’s retirement account, and only investors in high tax brackets
should invest in them at all.
● Funds saved for retirement should be invested primarily in equities
and longer-term ﬁxed-income securities.
● The fraction of assets invested in equities should decline with age. A
popular rule of thumb regarding the age-equity relation is that the per-
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18. If applied to the private sector, this same mistaken belief would imply that insurance
companies do not incur a liability when they issue policies, only when there are actual dam-
age claims.centage of one’s portfolio to invest in equities should be 100 minus one’s
age. So a person thirty years old should invest 70 percent in equities, and
a person aged seventy should invest 30 percent in equities.
● The fraction invested in equities should increase with wealth because
a wealthier individual should be able to handle more risk.
This practical advice can be derived from theoretical models similar to
the ones presented in section 8.1 above by making suitable assumptions
about either the investor’s utility function, external borrowing constraints,
or the stochastic processes governing security returns.
Nonetheless, there are some elements in the reasoning used to support
the conventional advice that contradict economic theory. The two I focus
on here are the ones that have the most potential to distort policy deci-
sions in all sectors (households, ﬁrms, and government agencies): Stocks
are less risky in the long run than in the short run, and stocks are a good
hedge against inﬂation in the long run.
These propositions lead people to think that, the longer their planning
horizon, the higher the fraction of their money they should invest in equi-
ties. As an example, consider the following “educational” information that
appears at the Vanguard Group’s web site: “In your early and middle
working years, when your investment horizon extends 40 years or more,
your primary investment objective should be to accumulate capital for
your retirement. At this point in your life, common stocks should be your
dominant investment option, for two reasons: Stocks have provided the
highest long-term total returns of any major asset class. While stocks also
have had the highest volatility level of any asset class, the passage of time
has a dampening eﬀect on their short-term ﬂuctuations.”
Since the 1960s, Paul Samuelson (1963, 1971, 1989, 1994) has been
demonstrating the logical ﬂaw in this reasoning. Using option-pricing the-
ory, I, too, have tried—with little success—to persuade professional in-
vestment managers that it is a mistake to think that stocks are less risky
in the long run than in the short run (see Bodie 1995).
I think that one reason that so many people still make the mistake is
that they (at least implicitly) deﬁne investment risk as the probability of
earning less than some target rate of return. In the practitioner literature,
this probability is called shortfall risk. It is indeed true that, if the assumed
expected rate of return on stocks exceeds the target rate of return, the
probability of a shortfall does indeed decline as the time horizon length-
ens. But the probability of a shortfall is a ﬂawed measure of risk because
it completely ignores how large the potential shortfall might be. A measure
of risk should take account of both the probability and the magnitude of
the potential shortfall (see Harlow 1991).
The proposition that stocks are a good inﬂation hedge relies on the
fallacious belief that stocks are not risky in the long run. An inﬂation
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at a future date with certainty. As discussed before, the asset with that
feature is an inﬂation-indexed bond maturing on the future date. Stocks
do not promise a sure inﬂation-protected return over any time horizon.
Another reason that people fall into the trap of thinking that stocks are
not risky in the long run is that they rely on faulty statistical inference.
They are persuaded by the stock market history of the United States and
the United Kingdom that, with virtual certainty, stocks will outperform
bonds over long periods. There are at least three arguments against draw-
ing such an inference from the historical data. The ﬁrst is the small number
of independent observations of long-period returns; the second is survi-
vorship bias; and the third is that bonds in the past were not protected
against inﬂation.
8.6 Summary and Conclusions
As the world’s population ages over the next few decades, governments
will shift from pay-as-you-go systems of social security to mandatory self-
directed retirement accounts. A major challenge facing the ﬁnancial ser-
vices industry is to help people manage the risks of investing for their own
retirement. One strategy that is likely to succeed is to provide new con-
tracts for long-term saving that combine the best features of deﬁned-
contribution and deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans.
This paper has attempted to show that ﬁnancial intermediaries can oﬀer
personal investment accounts that “replicate” the best features of deﬁned-
beneﬁt pensions. These accounts could oﬀer some choice regarding partic-
ipation in the “upside” potential of the stock market without jeopardizing
the minimum level of beneﬁts mandated by law. It has also attempted to
show that the existence of inﬂation-protected U.S. Treasury bonds makes
government guarantees of personal investment accounts unnecessary, that
guaranteeing investments in common stocks against the risk of a “short-
fall” can be very costly and creates the potential for moral hazard, and
that government can play a (perhaps unique) role in enriching the invest-
ment opportunity set by issuing securities that are linked to an index of
per capita consumption spending.
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Comment Stephen A. Ross
This is a simple paper in the best sense of the term. In a literature that has
become ever more complex, this paper takes us back to the basics and
grounds the problem of oﬀering investment choices to social security par-
ticipants in the bedrock of modern ﬁnancial theory. It begins with a his-
torical introduction that focuses on two central research areas, the
continuous-time consumption-portfolio problem and the principle of
spanning. The relevance of the continuous-time model of optimal savings
and consumption behavior is obvious, but that of spanning may be less
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ate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.so. It is well known that puts and calls span the space of opportunities.
They are like Arrow-Debreu pure contingent claims that oﬀer a dollar in
a well-speciﬁed state of nature, but they are an interesting alternative in
that they embody solutions to ﬁnancial problems. Calls, for example,
allow individuals to circumvent borrowing constraints and achieve a
higher degree of leverage while retaining limited liability. More technically,
they focus on the outcome of investments, that is, the distribution of re-
turns, rather than on the artiﬁcial mathematically deﬁned states in which
outcomes occur.
It is useful to follow the pension literature and break the pension prob-
lem into the accumulation phase, during which savings takes place, and
the payout phase, during which investments are harvested to ﬁnance con-
sumption in retirement. Arguing that there seems to be consensus in the
policy debate that any reform should leave social security mandatory and
should have a minimum guarantee, the paper examines the use of invest-
ment accounts with explicit ﬂoors on performance during the accumula-
tion phase—a principal guarantee—and participation in a stock index
return above the ﬂoor. This is equivalent to combining a bond with a call
option on the index. It is perplexing and ironic that, while in the United
States we are just beginning to examine this as a potential structure for
social security, it is a very popular private oﬀering in Europe. (By some
estimates, almost half of French bank accounts take this form.)
The form of this contract seems to have been shaped as much by the
current debate as by the theory of consumption and portfolio choice over
time. In general, having a guaranteed ﬂoor is equivalent to assuming that
agents have inﬁnite marginal utility below the cutoﬀ level. Above the ﬂoor,
this form is optimal only if the individual has a particular utility function
(lognormal returns would require a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility
function with particular parameters). It would be desirable to explore a
bit further whether we really are comfortable with this as the appropriate
form for preferences, although parsimony does seem to favor a contract
with a ﬂoor and a linear participation in the index.
Using the standard Black-Scholes formula, the paper computes the
value of these accounts for a grid of time horizons and guaranteed beneﬁt
ﬂoors. (There is a bit of a technical problem since the index pays no divi-
dends and the formula should be adjusted, but this is easily patched.)
Formally, if w is the proportion that the account puts into the option com-
ponent, then the terminal payoﬀ at retirement will be (1  w) times the
amortized amount in the bond account and w times the accumulation in
the option, that is,
( ) [ / ( , )] max [ ( / ) , ], 1 100 0 0 −+ − we wcxT S S x
rT
T
where r is the interest rate, c(x, T) is the value of a call option with matu-
rity T and exercise price x, and 100(ST/S0) is the ratio of the value of the
312 Zvi Bodieindex at time T to that today at time 0 and where the current index level
is taken to be 100. Changing x and T allows us to trace out the sensitivity
of this value to the parameters.
While this may seem like a simple exercise in option pricing, it is impor-
tant to stress that it stands in sharp contrast to the usual methods for
evaluating social security reforms. Typically, policy proposals are studied
by simulating future investment returns and asking, for example, what
level of funding will be required to sustain a given level of beneﬁts with a
given probability level. This is a bit like the value-at-risk approach often
taken to examine the riskiness of a portfolio or a ﬁnancial institution, and,
while it is sensible, it is also highly dependent on a variety of assumptions
about future stock return and, in particular, on the posited size of the
equity-risk premium. There is currently a heated debate under way about
whether the observed outperformance of the stock market is sustainable
for the foreseeable future. The typical simulation methodology stakes pol-
icy on a presumption about that issue by drawing future returns from an
estimate constructed from the historical record of market returns.
By contrast, the ﬁnancial market approach advocated by Bodie asks a
simpler question: Given the current pricing of ﬁnancial securities, what is
the cost of any particular policy composed of a ﬂoor return and an equity
“kicker.” In eﬀect, this turns the focus of the equity-risk puzzle on its head.
The question now becomes, not what the market will do in the future, but,
rather, whether the market prices used to compute the value of the options
are “correct.” If the market is, in some sense, “too high,” then that is a
consequence of having realized a sequence of unsustainable returns that
also, if used to project future returns, will result in an upwardly biased
estimate of the risk premium on equities.
Despite this duality, for many questions the ﬁnancial markets or option-
pricing approach is clearly superior. Even if, in some equilibrium sense,
we were all to agree that the current level of prices is appropriate, the
traditional mode of analysis would still leave open the debate about what
is the appropriate assumed future return on stocks. With the option-
pricing approach, that rate plays no role in determining the current value
of the strategy. In a real sense, the option approach does ﬁnesse the equity-
risk-premium puzzle. Furthermore, insofar as there is to be a debate about
whether the market is too high, any assumed level can be substituted for
the current one to produce a diﬀerent value for the strategy. But the intu-
itive “gut” check is simpler than that. The ﬁnancial markets approach
produces a clear price for any strategy, that is, the value it would have if
one tried to replicate the payoﬀs with currently priced instruments. What-
ever value emerges from that exercise is the price that such a strategy
would cost if implemented by the private sector. Any analysis that pro-
duces a lower value, then, is tacitly assuming that private-sector pricing is
wrong; that is, it is predicated on outguessing the market, and that would
seem a rather precarious basis for public policy. (One could argue that the
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this is diﬃcult to assess, such an eﬀect would probably be marginal at most
and is certainly highly conjectural.)
During the accumulation phase, the ﬂoor can be set in real terms, and
the government issuance of inﬂation-linked bonds (or per capita con-
sumption-linked bonds) provides a way of achieving a real guarantee. In
the payout phase, the government can guarantee the minimum payout
level, although Bodie sees little need for this given inﬂation-protected
bonds. Bodie goes on to argue that the private sector could provide this
service, given that the government has issued guaranteed linked bonds.
Presumably, however, to hedge their liabilities, private institutions would
have to rely in part on dynamic replication, and that is subject to model
risk, gap-trading risk, and volatility and other parametric risks. For the
system to work in an eﬃcient way, there would have to be some form of
regulation of these entities as well as private bonding and rating.
Given the economies of scope in such activities, the government would
have to play a role—after all, ultimately, it is a government guarantee
even if implemented by the private sector. However, given the history of
problems with the government regulation of such guaranteed systems,
from deposit insurance and savings and loans to guaranteed investment
contracts, it would be naive to be sanguine about how well it would work.
Equally important, to the extent to which individuals are given investment
choices, there will be a demand for ﬁnancial advice, and no doubt the
ﬁnancial advisory industry would expand dramatically in an eﬀort to sat-
isfy this demand. What is to be the role of government in this process is
as yet unresolved. For example, if the government is to be an active pur-
veyor of advice, presumably Bodie would have it side with those who argue
that the fraction invested in equities, say, should decrease with age. This is
much more obvious to Bodie than to me, particularly given that social
security accounts are only a portion of total savings and, also, given the
interaction between, for example, wealth and age.
There are, however, some more serious problems with a completely or
partially privatized system with its attendant regulatory structure and the
inevitable political pressures that will ensue. While I am very sympathetic
to the idea of allowing individuals to invest for their retirement and, per-
haps, have meaningful choices, I do not think that we can examine policy
changes and ignore the political economic implications. Nor is this a mat-
ter of idle speculation; there have been signiﬁcant historical examples
from which we can learn.
I think that political pressure will manifest itself in at least two ways.
First, if the system is to cost about the same as what we have today, then,
inevitably, there must be a nonnegligible chance that a signiﬁcant percent-
age of the participants will retire with less savings than they expected.
Depending on the form of the system, this may mean that all or a large
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of that. In either case, there will be a strong political motivation for the
less-advantaged bloc to attempt to achieve through the political mecha-
nism what they did not receive from the market. I have no particular wis-
dom on what to do about this problem, other than to acknowledge its
existence. One thing is clear, however—by both practice and by law, the
government seems bound to subgame perfection. That is to say, whatever
circumstances it currently faces, the government must myopically seek the
optimum. While that might seem desirable, it raises delicate incentive and
time-consistency issues. For example, if the government could credibly
commit to not aiding those whose investments led them to have less than
a minimum amount, individuals might be encouraged to follow policies
that kept them away from that ﬂoor. Since the government cannot commit
not to help individuals in distress, it will always be forced to do so, and it
must live with the consequences of individuals who recognize that they
have a political “put” for their poor performance and act accordingly.
The only solution to this is to limit individual choices severely, but that
raises the second and more subtle issue. When the system is privatized,
individuals will be given account statements that detail “their” accumula-
tions. When individuals reach retirement with a given level of accumula-
tion, it may not be politically tenable to continue to deny them the ability
to exercise their discretion in the payout phase. This was the experience
of the TIAA-CREF system for ﬁnancing pensions for employees in higher
education. In response to individuals who felt that their investment op-
tions were too limited in the accumulation phase, TIAA-CREF has greatly
expanded the available choices. With this has come the likelihood that the
spread of individual performances will be much widened, and that has led
to an attendant burden on ﬁnancial education for participants in the sys-
tem. In addition, many individuals were no longer content with the re-
quirement that their accumulations be annuitized on retirement.
The ﬁrst of these responses strongly suggests that, in the face of charges
of paternalism, it will be politically diﬃcult to restrain the range of choices
open to individuals in the social security system. The second is equally
devastating since it implies that it may not be possible to prevent some
signiﬁcant lump-sum distributions on retirement. (Even current tax penal-
ties do not seem an adequate disincentive to prevent this from occurring.)
To the extent to which the proceeds are not annuitized, the system no
longer owns the ill health of its participants, and risk-averse individuals
would have to oversave relative to an insurance system that operated as a
tontine and would be subject to the vicissitudes of their own mortality.
Here, form may be as important as substance. Bodie argues that the
guaranteed-ﬂoor system is usefully partitioned into a guarantee that is
equivalent to an indexed bond and a call option on the equity return. This
is equivalent (by put-call parity) to a contract that gives the return on an
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option to sell their portfolio back to the issuer—be it a private institution
or the government—at a prespeciﬁed price. Perhaps, when results are bad,
the fact that there is already an action that an individual can force on the
government, that is, the put, would ameliorate some of the political pres-
sure even though the numbers are the same. I suspect that this may be so,
but, as a ﬁnancial economist, venturing beyond the value equivalence of
the two descriptions is further than I can go with any conﬁdence.
Brieﬂy concluding, then, the ﬁnancial theoretic approach of Bodie is
very appealing on both intellectual and practical grounds. The case is
made most strongly for using it to evaluate the costs of proposed social
security reforms, but the unresolved political ﬁnancial issues make the
case for the particular reform analyzed and, more generally, for a privat-
ized system less clear.
Discussion Summary
Robert King remarked that, in a previous discussion, Thomas Sargent
wondered why certain insurance instruments did not exist and noted that
a similar puzzle applies here. About a dozen years ago, Chase Manhattan
introduced a security that looked very much like the ﬁnancial instrument
proposed in the Bodie paper: it consisted of an account where the investor
earned a particular interest rate and a portion of the market return if the
stock market goes up. The accounts-return characteristics were based on
Black-Scholes option-pricing principles. When the instrument was ﬁnally
approved by the U.S. regulatory structure, its subsequent introduction was
surprisingly unsuccessful. King noted that this is a major puzzle, which is
crucial for the kind of proposal made in the paper. Maybe Chase Manhat-
tan by itself was not able to oﬀer the education that is also called for in
the latter part of this paper; maybe there is something more fundamental
that could explain the failure. He concluded that, in any event, the paper
would beneﬁt from examining that particular market experience in order
to understand what actually happened.
John Campbell commented on the last section of the paper, dealing with
conventional investment advice. First, Bodie contests Vanguard’s state-
ment that stocks appear to be less risky in the long run than in the short
run. Campbell stated that the validity of that claim is an empirical issue,
not a theoretical or logical one, as suggested in the paper. There is some
evidence that the volatility of stocks rises with the horizon more slowly
than would be implied by independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
returns, which could be explained by mean reversion in stock returns. If
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preferences, it is indeed optimal to invest more in stocks on average with
a longer horizon. Of course, the mean reversion will also tend to generate
market timing: one cannot obtain the positive horizon eﬀect without also
having the market timing. The entire topic of stocks for the long run in-
volves quite some detail and subtlety. Campbell expressed the opinion that
the treatment of the subject in the paper is too cavalier. The logical points
that Samuelson made are “if-then” statements: if returns are i.i.d., and if
people have power utility, then the horizon does not matter. But those
logical arguments do not settle the practical issue of investing for the long
run: that is by and large an empirical matter.
Relatedly, Campbell noted that the treatment of the Canner, Mankiw,
and Weil (1997) (henceforth CMW) asset-allocation puzzle in the paper
lacks detail. CMW point out that popular investment advice suggests that
more conservative investors should have a higher ratio of bonds to stocks.
This contrasts with standard mutual fund theorems that prescribe holding
risky assets in a given proportion, regardless of risk aversion: more risk-
averse people could simply add more cash to the mix and scale back on
the mutual fund. As is mentioned in the paper, the explanation for this
puzzle given by Brennan and Xia, bringing in intertemporal considera-
tions, goes in the right direction. However, their explanation, ignoring in-
ﬂation risk, is complete only to the extent that the conventional advice
would concern real bonds. This is quite unlikely: the CMW paper was
published before inﬂation-indexed bonds were available, and the invest-
ment advice analyzed certainly concerned nominal bonds. Therefore, the
issue again becomes empirical: How close are nominal bonds to real
bonds? Are they similar enough to justify the conventional advice, or does
one need to modify the advice to stress real bonds rather than nominal
ones? Campbell and Viceira (in press) report that it all depends. If one
thinks that monetary policy will stay fairly stable as in the Greenspan era,
then nominal and real bonds are suﬃciently similar to rationalize the
CMW puzzle using intertemporal considerations, ignoring inﬂation risk.
The advice would be better for real bonds, but it is tolerable for nominal
bonds. If, on the other hand, one thinks that there is a risk of going back
to inﬂationary monetary policy, then the conventional advice is not correct
and needs modiﬁcation. Campbell concluded that there is a lot of empiri-
cal detail and that he worried that the paper ignores some crucial empiri-
cal questions, linking portfolio advice too closely to theoretical considera-
tions.
Mark Warshawsky remarked that TIAA-CREF also considered oﬀering
ﬁnancial products that combined real bonds with call options. They de-
cided, however, that, at least at this stage, it is not feasible to do so because
these long-term call options are very expensive. In response, King asked
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product was based on options with only one-year maturities.
Robert Shiller conjectured that only one- or two-year maturity options
are traded, not long-term lifetime options, because most investors buy
options for leveraging reasons, rather than to manage their lifetime secu-
rity risk. An analogous issue is that people have virtually no interest in
inﬂation-indexed bonds. They often complain that real bonds have not
performed very well in recent years. Relatedly, an important explanation
for the equity-premium puzzle, proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995),
emphasizes that investors have very short horizons. This theory would be
problematic for the ideas in the Bodie paper.
Henning Bohn pointed out that there is a caveat in the discussion of
social security reform and ﬁnancial engineering. Even if long-term call op-
tions were publicly traded, an important question to ask is who would be
taking the opposite side of these option contracts. It seems important to
consider aggregation and general equilibrium issues in this context.
James Poterba noted that Bodie is quite pessimistic about the ability of
investors to make sound asset-allocation decisions. He and David Wise
(Poterba and Wise 1998) reached a diﬀerent conclusion in a paper that
analyzed the investment decisions within 401(k) plans: except for the poor
degree of diversiﬁcation, the choices with respect to equity exposure did
not seem totally anomalous. Poterba also noted that, although indexed
bonds invested in a 401(k) or IRA plan earn a known real return, indexed
bonds held in taxable accounts do not, both because of the uncertainty
about the tax system and because the tax is based on the total cumulated
nominal interest. This means that there is uncertainty about what the real
after-tax return will be on withdrawal.
Following up on Poterba’s ﬁrst remark, David Cutler suggested adding
a discussion concerning the tails of the distribution of individual investor
choices. For instance, it would be interesting to mention what share of the
investor population does not make sound investment decisions.
Martin Feldstein expressed the opinion that the link to social security
beneﬁts was missing in the paper. In particular, he gave the example of an
individual who has to decide how much to save using these call options
to eventually acquire the funds to buy the annuity that ﬁgure 8.6 reports.
This calculation would be very interesting as it would allow the author to
really oﬀer investors ﬁnished ﬁnancial products among which to choose.
Zvi Bodie responded ﬁrst to Feldstein’s question about how much an inves-
tor would have to save to achieve some target replacement rate and noted
that the answer was straightforward only for investments at the risk-free
rate. Any other investment, including call options, would be uncertain.
Feldstein inquired about the case where the investor buys options to assure
a certain probability of meeting the target. Bodie replied that, although
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simulations reporting probabilities of achieving or not achieving some tar-
get. The problem is related to the disagreement between two papers pre-
sented earlier, that by Kent Smetters (chap. 3 in this volume) and that by
Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (chap. 2 in this volume). Bodie ar-
gued that the probability of a shortfall is a very misleading measure of
risk. It should be contrasted with the cost of insuring against the shortfall,
which Bodie believed to be a superior measure: the probability of a short-
fall does not consider the weight that one attaches to a shortfall or its
severity. Instead, one should concentrate on Arrow-Debreu prices or risk-
neutral probabilities, following the insight from option-pricing theory.
With respect to Campbell’s remark, Bodie agreed that the treatment in
the paper of the proposition that stocks are less risky in the long run than
in the short run could be considered too cavalier. He added, however, that
his previous work with Robert Merton and William Samuelson (Bodie,
Merton, and Samuelson 1992) oﬀers a more detailed and careful analysis
of the issue of life-cycle asset allocation and focuses, among other things,
on the importance of human capital and labor supply ﬂexibility. The paper
is one example of the discussant’s remark that the ﬁnance literature does
not oﬀer clear-cut and unambiguous answers to the question of optimal
life-cycle portfolio choice. For instance, it is found that, under certain con-
ditions, it is optimal to increase equity exposure as one ages, whereas, in
other circumstances, older investors should hold less risky assets. Bodie
concluded that, if anything is cavalier, it is the treatment of the subject by
popular investment advisers, stating that, unambiguously and indepen-
dently of preferences, stocks are less risky in the long run.
In response to King, Bodie noted that it is very rare in the history of
the ﬁnancial industry to ﬁnd an innovation that has been successful imme-
diately, except perhaps for money market funds, which succeeded from the
outset, mainly because of Regulation Q and because of high short-term
interest rates in the 1970s. Market conditions matter a lot. Bodie is opti-
mistic about the prospects of the products proposed in the paper in the
long run and refers to their success in Europe.
Regarding Shiller’s comment that investors are reluctant to buy indexed
bonds, Bodie replied that people change their investment behavior slug-
gishly. He added that part of the problem might be insuﬃcient marketing
eﬀorts trying to make indexed bonds known to the general public.
Finally, David Wise replied to Shiller’s comment, noting that long-term
options do exist and are available as over-the-counter products. Moreover,
they can be hedged relatively well dynamically using short-term options.
Wise concurred with Bodie’s discussion of the lack of initial success for
many new ﬁnancial products and gave the example of index funds. He
further noted that indexed bonds might not gain popularity in a country
like the United States characterized by relatively low and stable inﬂation.
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